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The splendid word ‘incarnadine’, for example – who can use 
 it without remembering also ‘multitudinous seas’?2 
 
 
 
According to historical usage, the term ‘natural theology’ implied a necessary completion 
of natural scientific enquiries. It tended to denote a discipline which sought, in 
ontological terms, apodictically to establish God as the supreme item in a chain of items.3 
In epistemological terms, it effectively presented God as but another objective item within 
reality which will passively endure our active search to isolate its nature.  
 
When, in his profound reflection on languages in The Edge of Words, based on his 2013 
Gifford lectures, Rowan Williams describes the work as offering ‘natural theology in a 
new key’, this self-description would seem to be given more in deference to the Gifford 
Bequest then to denote any continuity with the natural theological tradition as just 
described, whose assumptions today seem questionable, and which Williams both 
                                                
1  I am profoundly grateful to Fraser MacBride for turning his critical eye upon several passages of the 
present essay. 
2 Virginia Woolf, ‘Craftsmanship’, The Death of the Moth and Other Essays (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace 
and Company, 1942), pp. 198-207, p. 201. 
3 Michael Buckley SJ, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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articulates and refuses.4 What we require today is something more like a metaphysics, 
which, as with the metaphysical dimension of Aquinas’s thought, seeks to describe the 
fundamental structures of finite reality, and to gesture, with considerable reserve, towards 
the conditioning ground of these structures, or to “that which everyone gives the name 
God”.5 Yet this is what Williams is here offering. In the following essay, I will seek both 
to describe and tentatively to develop his endeavours.  
 
To suggest that The Edge of Words wields such a natural theological compass might seem 
strange, in view both of its predominant concern with human speaking, and especially 
poetical speaking, and its non-technical, approximate and allusive character. However, 
this is not a book about God-talk, nor about the internal workings of language; rather – 
and here Williams notes the influence of John Milbank – it offers an ontological account 
of the place of language in reality, and subsequently the place of speaking about God 
within that real linguistic place of origination.6 Williams argues that one cannot give such 
an account without considering the nature of finite reality itself. He offers the reader a 
theory of the nature of reality as itself linguistic. In keeping with his insistence upon the 
prone and unfinished character of language, he can only, if he is to sustain logical 
consistency, describe this theory by performing it. This performance is a part of his proof. 
Sidestepping any scheme of a priori rational order or empirical generalisation, and with a 
                                                
4  Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 1-10, 
esp. pp. 2, 10.  
5 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia Q. 2 a. 3 
6 The Edge of Words, pp. vii, 122-123.   
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Coleridgean bias towards the partial truth of any human perspective, Williams populates 
his discourse by invoking bystanders, exemplars and witnesses. This is of a piece with the 
‘other rigour’ of a theory of language which holds that uttered truth cannot be detached 
from embodied positions within both space and time, in all their non-predictability of 
occurrence and elective and as well as chance entailments.  
 
At the same time, metaphysics would be too narrow a carapace in which to confine 
Williams’s discourse. As he indicates, he is offering an ontological grammar shared by 
both natural and revealed theology. The received modern conception of natural theology 
as filling an ontic gap,7 rather than as struggling for ontological grounds of possibility for 
ontic givenness, is often seen as complemented by an approach to revelation whereby it is 
thought to be inserting one further ontic item into the world, as if arraigned for our 
scrutiny. As Williams argues, such an account of dogmatic theology as having a well-
defined object reduces God to something inert upon which one can gaze, rather akin to 
the typical natural theological approach.8  
 
In either case, Williams suggests, what is missing is history. If we attend to revelation as 
mediated by historical events which are only comprehensible through their antecedents 
and consequents, we will be disinclined to reduce the saturated character of the revealed 
disclosure to the ontic terms of its disclosing, though these may yet be appreciated in their 
                                                
7 The Edge of Words, p. 180. 
8 The Edge of Words, p. 5.  
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fathomless diversity, in contrast to a doctrinal approach which reduces theophany to a 
discrete or semelfactive item. Nor, Williams argues, should natural theology overlook the 
fact that we can only obtain a culturally and linguistically situated, and so temporally-
inflected access to both natural and divine reality.  This might seem like a postmodern 
exacerbation of modern, critical epistemology in terms of a more relativistic confinement. 
But, rather, Williams proffers a distinctively twenty-first century, metaphysically robust 
and – one might say – speculatively realist emphasis.9 For his argument is not that 
historical mediation provides a sceptical barrier to the knowledge of nature, and of 
essences, but rather that nature herself, especially for a post-evolutionary perspective, may 
be seen as inherently historical, and, in this respect, as proto-linguistic. Here the work of 
Conor Cunningham is cited.10 For Williams, matter begins to matter, and, indeed, he 
argues that matter is better understood through language, than language through matter.11 
Intelligent, speaking life is not plausibly regarded as an accidental upshot or by-product of 
evolution, but rather, the linguistic sphere is seen to complete and render clearer natural 
existence, and is by no means an insensate instrumental mirror which passively reveals its 
true character.  
 
                                                
9 See Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism (Edinbrgh: Edinburgh UP, 
2014);Peter Grafton and M. W. Austen, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects (London: Continuum, 
2014); Graham Harman, Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (New York: Zero Books, 2010).  
10 The Edge of Words, pp. 101-2, p. 106. 
11 The Edge of Words, pp. 35-65, pp. 95-125.  
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By adopting a kind of evolutionary idealism,12 Williams aligns his project with the ideal 
realism of much mediaeval scholasticism, and especially that of Thomas Aquinas, for 
whom, after Aristotle and Augustine, materialised form is continued in another and 
higher – if, for embodied creatures, a less substantive – mode, as the form and word of 
thought.13 For Aquinas, the truth of speaking does not concern pre-mental realities. It is 
rather that the latter carry a freight of structure, meaning and truth which are better – 
though abstractly and provisionally – realised in spoken thought. For this perspective, as 
Williams signals, truth is as much an event as a declaration. According to his terminology, 
one can combine both senses by speaking of “re-presentation”. By this term, Williams 
distances himself from Wittgenstein’s notion of truth as picturing, or representation, as 
put forward in the Tractatus.14 To reveal in an exact way is to repeat differently, and 
paradoxically to enlarge upon, add to or dilate that of which one speaks, in such a manner 
that one’s addition becomes an ineliminable – perhaps even an exalted – if most 
abstracted part of that which is disclosed. The dilation proffered by speakers is a 
meaningful floreation or “nourishment” which serves as a kind of gift, as Williams 
suggests.15 And it is at this point that meaningful abstraction is re-embodied in the 
linguistic community, in such a way that human beings are shown to be the disclosing 
culmination of the natural order.  
                                                
12 One could situate this within the Anglican liberal Catholic tradition; see Charles Gore ed, Lux Mundi: A 
Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation [1891] (London: Forgotten Books, 2012).  
13 See the second section of Olivier Boulnois, Métaphysiques rebelles : Genèse et structures d'une science au Moyen Age 
(Paris: P. U. F., 2013), “Les deux sens de la transcendence selon saint Thomas d’Aquin”. 
14 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 1.1. 
15 The Edge of Words, p. 33.  
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However, as Williams describes, in terms which bring Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty 
together, there is no anterior moment of isolated nomination. Nature is linguistic, 
articulating herself to us in several ways; and human speech continues as corporeal inter-
articulation, in such a way that the psychic, which rides upon or is wrapped around the 
bodily vehicle, is a constitutively inter-psychic sphere. Signs arise as always already agreed 
upon, symbolically exchanged by speaking bodies who perform and inflect them with a 
certain consensus, and yet always in diverse fashion, since such bringing-together is 
experienced as analogical sharing, and not projective or instinctual empathy.16 
 
By adopting this framework, Williams faithfully elaborates the Thomistic sense of truth as 
added event in order to accommodate a modern awareness of the unavoidability of 
embodiment, gesture, language and figured inflection. Here one senses a movement away 
from twentieth century philosophy, and a renegotiated emphasis in Williams’s own 
reflections. It has been argued that much mainstream philosophy of the last century 
concerned what the analytic philosopher Peter Unger has described as “empty ideas”, or 
ideas which are concretely insubstantial.17 Such an approach tends to identify the 
supposed inner consistencies and protocols of a postulated third realm of abstract 
                                                
16 The Edge, pp. 95-125. On the natural life of words, see Woolf, ‘Craftsmanship’: “Words [. . .] are full of 
echoes, of memories, of associations – naturally. They have been out and about, on people’s lips, in their 
houses, in the streets, in the fields, for so many centuries [. . .] [T]hey are so stored with meanings, with 
memories, that they have contracted so many famous marriages.” (p. 201). 
17 Peter Unger, Empty Ideas: a Critique of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 6. 
But see Timothy Williamson’s review, The Times Literary Supplement, 5833 (January 16 2015), pp. 22-23. 
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propositional entities available to human consciousness existing apart from physical 
realities.18 This realm could be variously the domain of logical or linguistic processes, or 
of intuited and intended phenomena. Either way, it was held to be irreducible to real 
things out there, and to consciousness or judgement in here. This perspective of critical 
realism, which includes both analysis and phenomenology, was apparently saved from 
idealism by the presumption of correlation between the third realm and an empirical 
surface layer of the real, a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would 
remain shut up in his inner world”.19 However, such correlation was not given any 
scientific warrant, and, by definition, it could not be justified within the terms of 
philosophy so defined. A certain emptiness and pointless self-reference ensues,20 to 
produce perspectives which do not sufficiently engage with the findings of modern 
science concerning the cosmos, on the objective side, and concerning the brain in terms 
of the objective grounds of the subjective. Some more recent philosophy has, by contrast, 
embraced naturalistic perspectives (in the analytic case, somewhat in the wake of W. V. O. 
Quine, Ruth Barcan Marcus and Donald Davidson),21 which it can be tempting for 
                                                
18 Gottlob Frege, ‘The Thought’, P. T. Geach tr Mind 65.259 (1956), pp. 289-311. See also Michael 
Dummett, ‘Frege’s Myth of the Third Realm’, Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), especially pp. 251-2; Tyler Burge, ‘Frege on Knowing the Third Realm’, Mind 101 (1992), pp. 
633-50. 
19 Frege, ‘The Thought’, p. 309. On correlationism, see Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: an Essay on the 
Necessity of Contingency Ray Brassier tr (London: Continuum, 2009).  
20 Margaret Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, British Philosophy in the Mid-Century C. A. 
Mace ed (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), pp. 283-357, p. 328. See also her aside, ‘Fictitious 
sentences in Language’, Essays on and in Machine Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge Linguistics Research 
Unit, 1959), Memorandum ML91, p. 18. 
21  See W. V. O. Quine,  ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 
(1957), pp. 1–17; Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Ruth Barcan 
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theology to abhor, having been invested in the abovementioned neutral but empty 
approaches of analysis and phenomenology, which at least appeared to guard against 
reduction to the empirically evidential, on the one hand, or the biologically relativistic, on 
the other.22  
 
However, to face up to the fullness of the real is not necessarily to invite reduction. Several 
recent atheist philosophers have suggested that a direct examination of the things themselves 
points towards realism and a certain hylomorphism, and not to naked materialism.23 
Equally, neural science has at times tended to undercut initial reductive ambitions. Rather, 
as Williams describes, analogical and holistic mental operations appear to have 
demonstrable physical equivalents.24 By invoking neurology, as for Graham Ward,25 
Williams arguably aligns himself with anti-anti-psychologism, whose mental correlate is 
that truths are, as Aquinas held, predicated of judgements, rather than of propositions.26 
To emphasise that we have the thoughts we do because we have the bodies and the brains 
we do, can – perhaps oddly – be seen as the opposite of reductive, insofar as judgements 
                                                                                                                                        
Marcus, ‘The Anti-Naturalism of Some Language-Centred Accounts of Belief’, Dialectica 49.2-4 (1995), 
pp. 113-30; Modalities: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Donald Davidson, Essays 
on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), especially ‘Mental Events’, pp. 207-225. 
22 For a critique of anti-psychologism, see Martin Kusch, Psychologism: The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge 
(London: Routledge, 1995).  
23 Tristan Garcia, Form and Object: a Treatise on Things Mark Allen Ohm and Jon Cogburn trs (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014).    
24 The Edge, 27-30, 189-190; Ian McGilchrist, The Master and his Emissary: the Divided Brain and the Making of the 
Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).  
25 Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why we Believe and Why we Don’t (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). 
26 Williams cites Wilfred Sellars’ presentation of speaking as determined in the manner of all physical 
behaviour and as socially situated; see Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1963) and Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968). 
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are made by conscious, or immanently conscious, flesh and blood creatures. Biological 
relativism is not involved here, if, as Williams argues, human speaking bodies are 
objectively disclosive of the real. It is because of his distancing from anti-psychologism, as 
well as from an hermetically-sealed third realm, that Williams claims representative truth 
not just for indexical statements, which might readily be digitised, but for complex 
symbolic truth which calls for judgement to be exercised. He seems to follow a realist 
phenomenology without idealist epoché, following the ontological drift of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, whose thought lies in the wake of the spiritual realist Maine de Biran, as well as 
that of Edmund Husserl. Williams seems prepared to allow that the condition of the kinds 
of truth to which human beings have access is inseparable from the structures of their 
brains, the integration of brain and body and the social rituals of their embodiment. 
 
The “empty” assumptions of twentieth century philosophy, mentioned above, can 
arguably be traced to the ontology of Bernard Bolzano, which was indebted to late Iberian 
and Bohemian Jesuit scholasticism. This lineage has been seen as the context for the 
apparent, though not wholesale,27 movement from the Thomist assignment of truths to 
                                                
27  The apparent re-assignment of truth from the domain of judgement to that of propositions was not 
universally accepted. Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, continued to think of 
judgement as the ultimate truth-bearer, and of propositions as abstractions from judgement. I am grateful 
to Fraser MacBride for this refinement. See Fraser MacBride, ‘Truthmakers’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed 
[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/truthmakers/]. 
 10 
judgement, to their reassignment to propositions.28 Truth appeared no longer to have 
need of a truth-maker, or else the role of truth-maker had become confined to entailment 
or necessitation.29 The etiolated realism to which this abandonment or confinement of the 
truth-making role gave rise often seemed preferable, especially within Catholic thought, to 
a Kantian subjectivism and exclusion of theoretical knowledge of noumena. But, as we have 
seen, it was inadequately defended against subjectivism, and in addition, it could only 
break from its formal circle by recourse to speculation and invocation, rather than pure 
description, while this circle was itself threatened by the exceptions to non-contradiction 
revealed by the Russell-Zermelo paradox.30 It is notable that further shifts have occurred; 
Graham Priest and Richard Routley, for example, are prepared to sacrifice logic to reality, 
feeling no impulse to shore up logical conundrums with arbitrary ruses.31 According to 
Priest’s dialetheism, or refusal of the ultimacy of non-contradiction, containing sets or 
bounds are typically contained and yet not contained in what they include, and are within 
                                                
28 Jan Berg, Ontology Without Ultra-Filters and Possible Worlds: An examination of Bolzano’s ontology (Bahnstr.: 
Academia Verlag, 1992); Jacob Schmutz, ‘Réalistes, nihilistes et incompatibilistes: Le débat sur les 
negative truthmakers dans la scolastique jésuite espagnole’, Dire le Néant: Cahiers de philosophie de la Université de 
Caen Basse-Normandie No. 43 Jérôme Laurent ed (Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2007), pp. 131-
178; J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 22-40.  
29 MacBride, ‘Truthmakers’. It is not that truth is made, in the sense of a pot being made, but rather, “a 
truth-maker is that in virtue of which something is true”. J. Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 125. 
30 Godehard Link ed, One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004). 
31 Graham Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman eds, Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent (München: 
Philosophia Verlag, 1989). See Jacob Holsinger Sherman, Partakers of the Divine: Contemplation and the Practice of 
Philosophy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), p. 55. 
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and yet outside the limits they define.32 For this reason, logical items cannot be mustered 
as a phalanx against a logically anarchic reality; Priest here invokes Nicholas of Cusa, De 
docta ignorantia I.VI. Rather, logical items are part of a universe of variegated things which, 
as Aristotle thought, though without advancing to paradox, arise with the terms of 
‘including’ and ‘being included’, whether in the case of rocks or flowers or grammars.33 
So, realism might be genuine and speculative, rather than critical, and it might start 
directly with things, rather than reflexively with our knowledge of things, because the 
critical domain has turned out to lack foothold, rather as Wittgenstein suggested as a 
response to Russell’s Janus-headed paradox, “Might one not even begin logic with this 
contradiction? And as it were descend from it to propositions?”34 The critical domain is 
secured neither in a posteriori evidence, nor a priori structures of reason. Rather, these always 
already qualify one another in such a manner that prevents the isolation of a clear starting-
point.35 Finally, as noted, the formal circle is not self-founded within non-contradiction, 
outside the greatest emptiness of all, which is tautology.  
 
                                                
32 Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); on Cusanus, 
pp. 23-24. See also Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2013), pp. 29-32. The inspiration for Graham Priest’s 
‘dialetheism’ came from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1978), where he describes the Liar sentence (‘This sentence is not true’) as a Janus-headed 
figure facing both truth and falsity (IV.59).  
33  Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, pp. 311, 358. 
34  Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics IV.59. 
35 W. V. O. Quine, ‘Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, The Philosophical 
Review 60.1 (January, 1951), pp. 20-43. 
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Williams’s realist approach to language could be seen as fitting within this contemporary 
movement. Indeed, he touches upon the question of the irreducibility of paradox with 
respect to the thought of Margaret Masterman.36 One could suggest that within an 
inhabited and realised, yet comprehending boundary, one which does not obtain to an 
absolute compass, two perspectives might be incompatible, yet both required, while 
without that boundary, which is infinite with respect to that boundary, they can be seen as 
fused.37 It seems that Williams does not wish to have recourse to Kant in the face of the 
collapse of the Bolzanian project. As he says, Kant was rightly dismantling the false 
perspectives of a later scholasticism which tended to argue to God as an ultimate item in 
continuity with other items.38 But Kant did not envisage that there might be non-ontic 
and non-graspable conditions of the possibility of the real, and not just of thought. It is 
clear that Williams does not think that such an exclusively epistemological endeavour is 
viable. This is because our thinking is not immunised against unpredictable physical and 
cultural influences, which can disturb our sense of what might be fundamental and 
transcendental. Nevertheless, he notes that the critical rigour of Kant’s demolition of a 
decadent scholastic does not leave Thomism unaffected, even if it leaves it mostly in place. 
This is because it has since purged itself of elements within Aquinas’s thought which 
                                                
36 Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’. 
37 The Edge, 126-127; Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’; see especially “Postscript”, 
pp. 357-8. See also Margaret Masterman, ‘Translation’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary XXV (1961), pp. 
169-216. 
38 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Norman Kemp Smith tr [2nd impression] (London: Macmillan, 
1933), 507-14. The Edge, pp. 11-18. 
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appeared to confuse the ontological with the ontic, and so has reinforced the ideal side of 
its ideal realism with a greater attention to cultural mediation and addition.39  
 
In the foregoing, I have indicated ways in which one can situate The Edge of Words within 
what one might describe as a post-postmodern context; one which seems to have moved 
away from the dogmatism of agnostic seclusion, and the sceptical reaction against it in 
favour of naturalistic realism.  
 
However, at the core of Williams’s natural theology, one finds a new kind of argument for 
God. This is not just for the God of Creation, but for a more specifically Christian deity. 
For Williams, history mediates between the witness of nature and that of revelation, and 
so his argument concerns a cultural grammar of analogy or naming God, and a natural 
longing for union with the divine perspective which is, for Christian tradition, by free 
divine gift.40 One could suggest that Williams is exploring, after Erich Przywara whom he 
cites, a realm between philosophical theology and sacred doctrine which is crucial for 
both; it is not a propaedeutic practice, but rather a continued necessity for their 
intellectual unity.41  
 
                                                
39 The Edge, pp. 11-14.  
40 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 2014). 
41 The Edge, p. 20; Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm Jon Betz and 
David Bentley Hart trs (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2013).  
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Williams’s argument, which, as we have seen, builds from ontology to theology, is that 
language must be added to nature, expressed in a dilation or further excess of nature, in 
order to represent it. Accordingly, there is no secure circle of mirroring through which 
the truth of language could be referred to natural reality. However, it stretches credulity to 
suppose that the dilation afforded by language, and so by culture and history, is merely 
arbitrary. Such a position would require that reality be a-rational, in such a way that 
thinking and speech were epiphenomenal, or included within reality under an extrinsic 
recourse to monistic process. If the linguistic addition to reality is indeed an addition, and 
yet not arbitrary, then nature must be teleologically attuned to intelligence which points to 
its being shaped by the intellectual as both a transcendental and a transcendent power.  
 
To establish this argument, which is Williams’s task throughout the book, he needs to 
show (1) that nature is not alien to language; (2) that language is not alien to nature, and 
(3) that the intelligent force at work in nature is more than immanent.  
 
In order to establish (1) that nature is not alien to language, Williams observes that the 
structures of nature appear to be ordered by numerical pattern at a basic level, fanning out 
to ever more complex patterns to indicate codes at a biological level. Nature, in a near-
literal sense, communicates with herself and with us, and offers something to us the more 
she approaches personality. So we are encouraged, as Williams explains, following 
Wittgenstein, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, to interpret or read reality, as when 
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discerning significance when hearing a wood pigeon cooing or when reading the 
expression on a dog’s face. It is in the same way that we interpret texts and read words, 
rather than infer to a state of affairs by assembling isolated units of evidence.42 Whilst 
there is an instrumental explanation for this tendency, in that processes of detached 
inference would take too long for animal survival, one might note that its possibility 
depends upon the fact that nature seems to announce herself with a sort of meaningful 
immediacy, as expressed by E. E. Cummings in La Guerre V:  
 
O sweet spontaneous 
earth how often have 
the 
doting 
  
fingers of 
prurient philosophers pinched 
and 
poked 
  
thee 
, has the naughty thumb 
of science prodded 
thy 
  
beauty, how 
often have religions taken 
thee upon their scraggy knees 
squeezing and 
  
buffeting thee that thou mightest conceive 
gods 
(but 
                                                
42 The Edge, pp. 111, 115.  
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true 
  
to the incomparable 
couch of death thy 
rhythmic 
lover 
  
thou answerest 
  
them only with 
  
spring)43 
 
 
It seems as though, for post-epistemological philosophy, if it is the case that meaning is 
not out there, then it could not obtain in here.44  Human speech, with its still greater variety 
and creativity, is not an interloper upon the domain of nature, and so, as Williams argues, 
we are mistaken if we complain that science has disenchanted the world.45 
 
This conclusion seems to be in keeping with the fact that observation, experiment and 
speculation, which constitute scientific cognitive practice, are neutral with respect to any 
possibly reductive perspective, even though some might contend that such a perspective 
perforce grasps the world under the aspect of identical repeatability as determinative of 
                                                
43 E. E. Cummings, ‘La Guerre’ V, Complete Poems 1904-1962 George J. Firmage ed (London: W. W. 
Norton, 1973), pp. 53-58, 58. 
44 Garcia, Form and Object, pp. 120-125.  
45 The Edge, p. 120.  
 17 
experimental success.46 Indeed, the objective witness of experiment has been known to 
indicate unaccountable forces and indicative codes irreducible to mechanism, as well as, 
by negative evidence, the presence of the irregular or spontaneous. One could argue that 
at times scientific procedure may have fallen short of the expectations of those seeking to 
demonstrate the transparency and predictable manipulability of the natural realm. 
Nonetheless, it is perhaps to this degree that science has been able to re-enchant our 
reality, as is the case with much modern physics.47 Equally, those who might complain of 
disenchantment are not perhaps targeting science, as rather those seeking to rescue reality 
from a reduction to what can be predicted and described. In this sense, Williams is a re-
enchanter in the face of a technological and spectacular drift for which scientists are not 
to blame. This is by no means to gainsay that there may be scientists who adhere to a 
technologising attitude, as if the Strong Cartesian Programme of flattening reality to an 
indistinct and arbitrarily divisible chronotope were still a driving force. It is perhaps 
imponderable if or how far such an attitude dictates the priorities of science, or 
determines its dependence upon technological exigency aimed at increasing formal 
power, size or speed. For such a perspective, though, Williams’s project is, as he indeed 
presents it, distinctively counter-cultural.  
                                                
46 David Bohm, ‘On the Problem of Truth and Understanding in Science’, Critical Approaches to Science and 
Philosophy, Mario Bunge ed (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), chapter 14, especially p. 
212. See Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaeffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985/2011).  
47 See Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Xin 
Wei Sha, Poiesis and Enchantment in Topological Matter (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
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In order to establish (2), that language is not foreign to nature, Williams adopts several 
strategies which occupy much of the book. Most of our speech, he argues, is neither 
directly pictorial nor descriptive. In order to describe, we must have recourse to 
invocation. This anterior figural process is never completed, and is matched prospectively 
by an accompanying sense that more has yet to be said – a sense that, for all Spring’s 
repleteness in Cummings’ poem, the gift of reality to us must be met by a counter-gift. It 
is as if a seascape naturally precipitates or demands an encomium, as naturally as it is 
shaped by swell and wave breaking. These poetic aspects of truth-making, it seems, 
covertly enter into our ordinary prosaic practices, and yet we are not attended by the sense 
that we are arbitrarily making things up or being dishonest as to the way things are.48 Do 
we rather feel that we are responding to the impress of reality, its imperatives?49 The 
trope here deployed by Williams is one of completion, yet of a constitutively incomplete 
completion which may involve much tearing down and re-building. Above all, completion 
demands fiction; this is intended in the twofold sense of (a) something which can be 
made up or composed, and (b) a falsity which is an untruth to things, and not just a 
misrepresentation.  
 
                                                
48 See Woolf, ‘Craftsmanship’; Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, pp. 301, 307. 
49 See G. W. Goethe, Botanical Writings Bertha Muella tr (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow, 1952); Agnes Arber, 
The Natural Philosophy of Plant Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 70-92; The Manifold 
and the One (London: John Murray, 1957); Pierre Hadot, Le Voile d’Isis: Essai sur l’histoire d’idée de nature (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2004), pp. 321-328. 
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In the context of this discussion of the figural and asymptoptic thrall of the representation 
of reality in language, and the role in this of superfluity and fiction,50 Williams offers a 
critique of Paul Griffiths’ insistence that one must tell the literal truth if one is not to 
betray the destiny of language as the vehicle of truth – which he is nonetheless right, as 
Williams notes, to emphasise.51 Ibsen’s The Wild Duck is invoked to re-articulate the 
difficulty.52 
 
Words, then, are not merely to be seen as proffered analogies as to content; they are 
themselves analogous, as words to things. Williams resists the arbitrariness of the sign, 
and, through an invocation of Aristotle’s model of the action of an object’s form upon the 
knowing subject, indicates that he is aware how close this brings him to a magical theory 
of speech.53 He is careful, though, to distance himself from a reduced magic of one-to-
one wonder-working correspondence of word or process to thing. However, if, as 
ethnographers such as Marcel Mauss have argued, magic is an irregular ritual art 
summoning a learned prudence,54 then the account of poetry given by Williams, for 
which words invoke, conjure and fulfil, would seem magical to the degree that a kind of 
occult affinity were at stake. I suggest the word ‘occult’ because one cannot survey such a 
likeness without recourse to poetry, so rendering it irreducible to description; and 
                                                
50  Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographical Language’, pp. 335-6. 
51 Paul Griffiths, Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004). 
52 The Edge, pp. 46-50.  
53 The Edge, pp. 109-110.  
54 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic Robert Brain tr (London: Routledge, 2001).  
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‘affinity’, because we would otherwise be wrong to exercise faith that words can 
represent; this is the faith which Williams calls for throughout this book. Aleksei Losev 
and Sergei Bulgakov, the Russian symbolist philosophers whom he invokes, consciously 
sought to bring together the esoteric with mainline theological tradition.55  
 
Williams elaborates his theory of poetic representation with a beautiful account of Welsh 
poetry.56 The mark of the enchantment of traditional poetry, of which Welsh prosody is a 
refined example, is seen in the way in which strict and complex rules concerning rhyme, 
assonance, alliteration and other sound patterns encourage the discovery of unexpected 
affinities between word, meaning and evoked reality. As Williams says, such resonances, 
though wrought by a tightly disciplined art, cannot be ruled in advance, and there may be 
surprises in the realisations which we receive.57 One might suggest that the modernist 
reaction against the formal use of such traditional means, whilst it could indicate a 
disenchanting warrant to anarchy, the aleatory or psychological expressionism, might be 
seen as a reaction against a perceived weariness of enchantment, for which associations 
have become predictable, patterns lacking in surprise or personifications of nature worn 
by familiarity. From such a perspective, modernism had to re-enchant our perception by 
                                                
55 The Edge, pp. 110-1; see further John Hughes, ‘Bulgakov’s move from a Marxist to a Sophist Science’, 
Sobernost 24.2 (2002), pp. 29-47. 
56 The Edge, pp. 132-134. See Masterman’s discussion of Chinese poetry, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic 
Language’, p. 349 ff. 
57  For a similar non-Saussurean analysis of the accumulated and non-arbitrary layers of affiliation in the 
sound-attachments of traditional verse forms, see J. H. Prynne, Stars, Tigers and the Shape of Words (London: 
Birkbeck, 1993); see also Woolf, ‘Craftsmanship’. 
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approaching things the other way around, by searching for the word or pattern which 
would fulfil a certain reality, or an idea not fully present until the right word or pattern 
could be found. As for Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot, such modernism does not pretend to 
the aleatory, but rather to free play or spontaneity within established formal games. By the 
same token, nature could speak again if her voice issued, as it were, directly and without 
stale familiarity, from her: “April is the cruellest month, breeding | Lilacs out of the dead 
land”.58 
 
Williams’s metaphysics retains a modernist as well as symbolist nature. He seems 
welcoming of formal philosophic and poetic devices, yet with an eye to spontaneity, so as 
to realise the formal affinities which are needed in order to show unexpected affinities.  
 
Two comments follow here. First, one might suggest that such an approach, which lets 
content lead to form, as well as form to conjure content, is very magical indeed. And, 
secondly, a link might be drawn between (a) the poetic balance of discipline and 
spontaneity, being linked with its potential for an addition, or “discovery”, and not mere 
representation, and (b) Masterman’s ideographical interlingua. Masterman’s optimism 
concerning the creative potential of the computer and the contrivance of machine 
translation are easy to set aside in the light of our dominant sense of the computer as “a 
                                                
58  T. S. Eliot, ‘The Waste Land’, Poems 1909-1925, I, lines 1-2, (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), pp. 81-
109, p. 83. See also ‘Gerontion’: “In the juvescence of the year | Came Christ the tiger | In depraved 
May, dogwood and chestnut, flowering judas, | To be eaten, to be divided, to be drunk | Among 
whispers”, Poems pp. 49-53, lines 19-23. 
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myriad of clerks or assistants in one convenient console”.59 This passive or 
representational construal of the computer is not due to a limit or deficiency in its 
technological compass, but rather to our own confined use of the computer as a 
receptacle, and our replicating of a minimal notion of writing as a useful device to retain 
discrete facts, as suggested by the Egyptian God Thamus, in Plato’s account of the myth of 
the invention of writing in Phaedrus.60 For this interchange between Theuth and Thamus, 
writing is in no way connected with the generation of true knowledge, but rather seen as 
a passive facility for reminding.61 One notes a parity between this and our quantitative 
notion of measurement as a neutral tool which leaves the world as it is.62 By contrast, for 
Masterman and others, her techniques were thought to defamiliarise our perception, 
forcing “a crisis of understanding from which a new, more adequate cosmology arises”.63 
                                                
59  Susan Wittig, ‘The Computer and the Concept of Text’, Computers and the Humanities 11 (1978), pp. 211-
215. 
60  “The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which 
it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, ‘This invention, O king’, said Theuth, 
‘will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and 
wisdom that I have discovered’. But Thamus replied, ‘Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to 
beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; 
and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power 
the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds 
of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, 
produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own 
memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your 
pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction 
and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get 
along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise’”, Plato, Phaedrus H. N. Fowler tr (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), 275a-b. 
61 Phaedrus, 277d. 
62  Willard McCarty, ‘A telescope of the Mind?’ Debates in Digital Humanities Matthew K. Gold ed 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp. 113-123, p. 113-4. McCarty cites Thomas 
Kuhn, ‘The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science’, Isis 52.2 (1961), pp. 161-93. 
63 McCarty, ‘A Telescope for the Mind?’ p. 113. 
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Along similar lines, Herbert Simon, for example, wrote, “Machines think! Learn! Create!” 
One thinks of the alternative, higher writing on the soul, described by Socrates as “written 
with intelligence in the mind of the learner”,64 and one wonders how one might 
nowadays reconstrue theologically the relationship between writing and philosophy in the 
light of the foregoing discussions, and especially the advance in the digital economy with 
its own innate patterning, relational vertices and peculiarly panoptic scope for yoking 
disparities. 
 
It is less clear, perhaps, how Williams is to establish (3), that the divine intellectual force 
is not merely immanent. He seems to problematise this task by rightly denying a closed 
account of the self-sufficiency of finite substance, for if substances are ultimate, they tend 
to depend upon an ultimately vertical explanation, as for Aristotle. Following Margaret 
Masterman, he sidelines the linguistically concomitant expression of things in terms of 
subject and predicate,65 in favour of an ideogrammatic approach to an holistic picture, 
“fan” or “spray” of a thing,66 through its complex co-ordinates, near and far, causal, 
simultaneous and consequent, via a kind of panoptic mapping or archiving of 
contingency.67 Such an approach, philosophically adjacent to A. N. Whitehead’s fractal 
                                                
64 Phaedrus, 276a. 
65 Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 309; pp. 318, 330. 
66 On semantic message detection for machine translation using an interlingua, see Masterman, Language, 
Cohesion and Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 83-106; on the “fan” or “spray”, 
see pp. 39-56. See also Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 357. 
67 The Edge, pp. 105-108. This approach, and the role of new technology, were seen to have far-reaching 
socio-political and cultural implications, especially in the context of the European Commission; see 
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metaphysics, can seem to favour the ultimacy of event and process.68 One notes, however, 
a resonance with Tristan Garcia’s recent speculative realist work, Form and Object, in which 
he abhors the supposed “compactness” of ultimate and self-enclosed process, as well as 
the compactness of pure substance as inclined to deny the irreducibility of the singular 
thing.69 For although he might not subscribe to Garcia’s ontological latitude and refusal of 
hierarchical and relational embedding,70 it is apparent that Williams shares a distancing 
from compactness of process. He is clear in his resistance to immanent 
comprehensiveness, whether material or intellectual, and the reduction of relationality to 
the necessary internal constitution of a thing, though relations are not to be exhausted by 
accidental externality.71 Rather, ideographical clusters or vertices of interlocking networks, 
densities and pressures obtain at all intermediate levels of reality, but there is no 
authoritative or natural calligraphy.72 It is this middle position which we must try to echo 
in our own writing, if its many-sidedness is to give us to, and embed us within many-
sided reality.73  
                                                                                                                                        
Masterman, “The Essential Skills to be acquired for Machine Translation”, Translating and the Computer B. M. 
Snell ed (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd, 1979), pp. 159-180, p. 159. Other examples of the 
application of the ideographic interlingua are explored, for example, by Margaret Masterman, R. M. 
Needham and K. Spärck Jones, ‘The Analogy between Mechanical Translation and Library Retrieval’, 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Scientific Information (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 
1958), pp. 917-935. For a discussion of the way in which the potential of machine translation, as 
envisaged by Margaret Masterman and others, has not been realised, see McCarty, ‘A telescope of the 
Mind?’ pp. 113-123, and see main text above. 
68 Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 311; see also The Edge, p. 105. 
69 Garcia, Form and Object, pp. 19-74.  
70 The Edge, p. 99. 
71 The Edge of Words, pp. 107-108.  
72 Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 310. 
73 On many-sidedness, see Woolf, ‘Craftsmanship’. 
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This implies interplay between the relational and the lapidary or substantive.74 Substance 
cannot be dissolved, any more than it can be rescued by Williams in the manner of Garcia, 
via an ontologistic monadology for which every thing – reality, sign, idea – enjoys 
transcendental priority and disconnection from the lattices of inclusion which characterise 
a thing’s phenomenal existence.75 For such a transcendental democracy, each thing is 
identical with the void from which it is subtracted. Williams, by contrast, considers there 
to be what one might call meta-relations between the knots and clusters which are 
substantive things, and the networks of relations from which they are inseparable. To 
embrace such a reality, though it conforms to common sense, implies a hidden holding-
together, both in terms of the regular habits which constitute things, and the regular 
habits which connect things together.  One might invoke a further theme in Masterman’s 
writings, namely, the idea that, for both nature and language, the same thing is always 
being said and done, but with myriad tiny variations.76 There is no sameness without 
these variations, as was affirmed by Søren Kierkegaard, Félix Ravaisson and Charles 
Péguy.77 One might indeed connect Williams’s argument to God, which, according to the 
subtitle of his book, is concerned with the habits of language, with Maine de Biran and 
Ravaisson’s distinction between the valued and good habits of non-identical repetition and 
                                                
74 Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, pp. 294, 309. 
75 Garcia, Form and Object, pp. 19-80.   
76  Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, pp. 309-315. 
77 For elaborations on this point, see Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 28-39; pp. 99-101.  
 26 
bad habits of identical repetition mixed with randomness. For this distinction, if good 
habits are considered to be natural, then they indicate the workings of intelligence, and 
even grace – as gift and beauty – within nature, since nothing immanent can precede a 
habit if it is fundamental.78 Williams’s perspective implies that neither substance nor 
process is irreducibly basic; rather, the habitual interplay between lapidary identity, itself 
habituated, and the typical relations and co-ordinates in which it stands, are basic. If these 
are to be transcendentally accounted for, and not reduced to surd meaningless persistence 
or randomness, these partially intelligible fluid structures perforce derive from a 
transcendent intellectual plenitude. Williams links this perspective with his own more 
open-windowed version of monadology, inspired by David Bohm’s notion of implicate 
order: each finite reality gestures in its microcosmic structures and signs to a presupposed 
completed whole, which however can never be present within time.79 
 
The interplay between substance and process is therefore necessarily also one between 
things and transcendent universals, since it is the surplus of universality (and ultimately of 
divine ideas) which forbids any compact closure, whether by the discrete thing or by the 
finite flow of reality. In Masterman’s terms, which Williams echoes, this vertical tension 
                                                
78 Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair trs (London: Continuum, 2008). See further 
the (as yet unpublished) doctoral dissertation of Simone Kotva, ‘Repetition and Reciprocity: Philosophies 
of Suffering in the Stoicisms of Gilles Deleuze and Simone Weil’ (Cambridge University, 15 April 2015), 
chapter 2. 
79 The Edge, pp. 104-108, referring to David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1981).  
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is, however, played out at an horizontal level.80 One finds a tension between substance 
and process, or between relatively stable subjects and predicated events, in keeping with 
subject/predicate grammar, but also a tension between relatively general initial indications 
of a thing or states-of-affairs and a relatively particular modifying, superadded, statement, 
according to grammatical ideography, as when one adds ‘greenness’ to ‘treeness’, rather 
than ‘green’ to ‘tree’. For this approach, ordinary language is always computationally 
reckoning with the metaphysical, since universal, metaphysical notions are part of its very 
composition. And, as Masterman argues, since the initial concept is somewhat open to 
vagueness, the qualifying term can be perceived as analogically akin to it, without one 
being able to reduce this likeness to univocity. In an equivalent way, it can also be unlike, 
without one being able to reduce this to equivocity. The reason for this likeness and 
unlikeness, in both cases, is that the initial statement is not sufficiently precise for one to 
secure exactness of agreement or contradiction. Rather, the addition of ideographic 
qualifications is itself the very attempt to arrive at further exact specification or 
disambiguation, even though this process can never be brought to completion, but 
involves receding aspectual insight. Masterman here echoes Husserl and Heidegger as well 
as Wittgenstein. 
 
In this way, Masterman suggests, paradox is never outright, or at its uttermost point, since 
that would depend upon an initial univocity of terms which is not available. Rather, the 
                                                
80 For the following discussion, Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’.  
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practicable exigent site or instantiation of paradox (and here one detects a kinship with 
Kierkegaard) is that of non-identical repetition. What Masterman offers is a palliation of 
paradox which falls short of outright deflation. And this is closely connected with a non- 
or post-nominalist interplay between unavoidable abstract or universal terms, on the one 
hand, and relatively – for this contrast can only be one of degree for the ideographic 
perspective – more concrete ones, on the other hand. Repetition (of the kind of which 
Kierkegaard, Charles Péguy and Gabriel Tarde spoke)81 is defined by non-identical 
variation because the universal is never sufficiently determinate as universal, and likewise, 
the particular never attains to sufficient determination as particular. And so it is the case 
that these two levels constantly interfere with one another in human discourse and have 
always already done so.  
 
For realist scholastic thought, in the finite world, a universal is only realised in a thing or a 
thought (which is also a kind of res), while inversely, a thing only exists as expressing a 
universal. One finds here a kind of paradoxical coincidence, which the nominalists often 
construed as unacceptably contradictory.82 Masterman, however, suggests a means by 
which one might relatively deflate such an appearance of contradiction, insofar as the 
particular thing is not outright and so problematically identical, as particular, with its 
opposite, which is a universal, since its particularity is salvaged through an asymptotically 
                                                
81 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, pp. 21-40.  
82 See, for example, William Of Ockham, Summa Logicae I. 15, 5-6; Ordinatio I d. 2 qq. 4–8; Quodlibet 
II 4 resp;  IV 9; VI 25; XIII a.1; Reportatio III q. 9. See also Kurt Flasch, Philosophie mediévale Jeanne de 
Bourgknecht tr (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), p. 106. 
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aspectual differential iteration. Equally, universality is recouped by virtue of its 
transcendent surplus to this process, which never completely expresses what there is to be 
expressed.  
 Masterman notes that this interplay applies to God, in the case of the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity. For this doctrine, it is not simply that God is one and three in 
different contexts according to propositional logic; one, for example, when we are 
speaking of the Godhead’s creative action, and three, when we are speaking of incarnation 
and the descent of the Spirit.83 But, in addition, it pertains that the divine Unity in itself 
can only be adequately explicated as three, according to an ideographic logic for which 
“we have a feeling of absorbing parallel clusters, rather than of making statements, from 
first to last”.84 
 
However, it remains the case, as Masterman does not say, that paradox is not hereby 
exhaustively qualified. This is because these many non-identical repetitions are held to 
coincide with the ineffable unity of the universal, including the Trinitarian personal 
iteration of the divine essence, which Nicholas of Cusa described as ‘repetition’.85   And 
this perfect coincidence is also exemplified by the circumstance that the universality of the 
universal is not guaranteed only by its reserve, but also by its own repetition through new 
particular invocations. In the case of the Trinity, however, the reserve absolutely and 
                                                
83 ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, 306.  
84 ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 346.  
85 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, pp. 193-197.  
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unthinkably coincides with the repeated expression.  To recall, it is just this repeatability 
of the universal (and not just that of the particular) which defines and allows non-
identical repetition. For this reason, the scenario described at the end of the last paragraph 
is reversible. It is equally true to say that the surplus of universality is recouped through 
the need for non-identical repetition, and that this repetition is never equal to the 
transcendent singularity of the ineffable particular. Non-identical repetition does not serve 
to distinguish the way in which something is universal from the way in which it is 
particular, and so to deflate paradox. Rather, it reasserts a coincidence of the two to the 
point of apparent contradiction. One can only palliate this contradiction by playing 
through or inhabiting the never-ending tension of such coincidence in iterative, analogical 
variation. This is perhaps best accommodated or captured by an ideographic grammar. But 
it is only in God – in whom the particular and universal, original and image, infinitely 
coincide – that this tension is both fulfilled and overcome. In the finite world, we must be 
reconciled to the perplexity of the interplay of the particular and universal which is the 
reflex of the incomprehensible grounding of the finite in the infinite.86 
 
Williams appears to affirm the irreducibility of metaphor and analogy in their paradoxical 
extremities which involves an horizontal and irresolvable exchange between universal and 
                                                
86 See Johannes Hoff’s response to Daniel O’Connell, ‘Cusa, Modernity and the “other” 
Dominican tradition’ in the symposium on Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas 
of Cusa, in Syndicate: A New Forum for Theology (forthcoming in May/June 2015) 
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particular in accord with a balancing of substance and process upheld by a participation in 
transcendence. 
 
Immanence could nevertheless be said to operate as a kind of foil in The Edge of Language, a 
foil or counterpoint which is partially entertained. One can observe parity between 
Williams’s deployment of the Zen koan, his rendering of negative theology, his invocation 
of Hegel and his theme of language as incomplete.   In discussing these four examples, 
Williams persuasively shows that one cannot assert the completion of a finished or caused 
thing, work or expression, but, at the same time, one should not exalt absence, negation, 
failure or exhaustion. Against sentimental invocations of silence, Williams advises of the 
necessity of situation to any significant pause or ellipsis. It is articulated along with 
affirmations, and indeed there can be no affirmations not so punctuated.87 However, 
might one suggest that the Zen Buddhist spiritual perspective, in denying the ultimacy of 
involvement or retreat, risks leaving the causal series from which there is no finite escape 
in a non-teleological state of suspended indifference.88 Can escaping the “dualities of here 
and there, subject and object” be compatible with the engaged middle path between 
density and relation discussed above?89  A similar difficulty might pertain if the via negativa 
                                                
87  The Edge, pp. 154-5, 156-85. See Masterman, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, p. 300. On 
the literary significance of ellipsis points, and the link between the rise of their use in the last two 
hundred years and the thematisation of the fragmentary and incomplete nature of thought, see Anne 
Toner, Ellipsis in English Literature: Signs of Omission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), especially 
pp. 151-170. 
88  The Edge, pp. 164-5. 
89  The Edge, p. 165 
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is to be read, according to Denys Turner’s asymptotic negation,90 by moving beyond 
either affirmation or denial into an irreducible Weilian attente.91 Might the Dionysian 
mystical path, which transcends kataphasis and apophasis, interpreted by Aquinas as an 
eminent, negatively qualified projection of the positive, provide an affective non-totalising 
correlate of waiting? Such a path presumes a bringing-together of ekstasis and absence, 
impossible to understand or represent, yet experienced or received in time.92 Perhaps it is 
in this way that one might render a difference between a Christian and a Buddhist 
perspective, since the purpose of the Christian analogical path of ascent is that, within the 
series of arising entailed realities, there are preferences to be made or affinities to be 
elected, poetic responses in which particular places and particular words respond to one 
another’s thrall, or are more appropriately linked with particular times or themes. By 
being reconciled to the impress of these contingences, one seems to draw closer to the 
transcendent goal, which is not conceived as withdrawn into existential indifference.93 
Silence is not the last word, but shares penultimacy with utterance, if we are to adhere to 
their situated character.  
 
                                                
90  Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
91  But see Kotva, ‘Repetition and Reciprocity’, Chapter 4, especially pp. 158-162. Here it is argued that, 
for Weil, attente is construed in intentional and orientated terms.  
92 Timothy D. Knepper, Negating Negation: Against the Apophatic Abandonment of the Dionysian Corpus (Eugene OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2014).  
93 “As knower and speaker, I must come to terms with finitude, with limit [. . .]”. The Edge, p. 108 
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Is this to transcend Hegel? This is perhaps a secondary issue in this context. For the 
somewhat Romantic or even Thomistic Hegel which Williams recommends, after Andrew 
Shanks and Nicholas Adams,94 Hegel can speak in favour of analogy, paradox and the 
ultimacy of artistic representation. However, for an immanentist ‘death of God’ reading, 
such as that of Slavoj Žižek,95 the rebounding of absolute, realised intelligence towards the 
contingent and historical sphere is a dialectical exhaustion of this intelligence in the 
formal structures of freedom whose content at the end of history will be the randomness 
of the freely elected. 
 
His reading of Hegel according to the former model indicates how Thomistic, in an 
extended sense, Williams’s frameworks are.96 Were this not the case, he might have been 
tempted, in line with a confined reading of Masterman, to witness to the importance of 
poetry by translating it into terms which could be fanned and then fed into machine 
translation, and this would no longer depend upon a truth-maker.97 Such a translation, 
                                                
94  Nicholas Adams, Eclipse of Grace: Divine and Human Action in Hegel (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); Andrew 
Shanks, A Neo-Hegelian Theology: The God of Greatest Hospitality (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).  
95 Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012). 
96 The Edge, pp. 186-197.  
97 I have argued above that Margaret Masterman’s formulation of ideographical language serves as a 
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with the seventeenth century optical telescope (‘Freeing the Mind’, Times Literary Supplement 284 (17 April), 
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the telescope “was a factor in changing [the seventeenth century] picture of the world” (p. 23). As 
Willard McCarty outlines, she insisted upon its potential for qualitative, and not just quantitative 
transformation; McCarty, ‘A telescope of the Mind?’, p. 113. See Masterman’s detailed elaboration of the 
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one might argue, would risk absolutising the transcendental conditions of poetry, 
producing not just an epistemological but an ontological transcendentalism, without need 
of vertical transcendence. Williams does not read the unfinishedness of poetry as 
suggesting the hypostasised superiority of incompletion, as one might if one were 
following a Derridean or postmodern–Kantian mode. Rather, what matters is the next 
monadic word-grouping which has, for now, an anticipatory finality, though we know 
that this estate will soon enough pass, though with partial exceptions and surprises. The 
reason for favouring transcendence over the transcendental is that, for such a perspective, 
transcendence eminently gives the irreplaceable contingent, monadic moments of finite 
reality their significance.  
 
In the foregoing, I have suggested that language as addition and truth as event restore a 
realism which points towards a requisite transcendence. This is Williams’s argument to 
God, as we have seen. It involves, as he indicates – with a citation of the work of Douglas 
Hedley – a participation of being, and of natural and cultural creativity and imagination in 
the Divine creative Logos.98 Yet this invocation, by poetic means, of a traditional realism, 
somewhat qualifies it, insofar as the transcendental setting for poetry, or the habitual 
unfolding of natural-cultural reality, cannot sustain the indication of vertical 
                                                                                                                                        
notion of “philosophical discovery”, ‘Metaphysical and Ideographical Language’, pp. 283-314, and main 
text above. 
98 Douglas Hedley, Living Forms of the Imagination (London: T. and T. Clark, 2008). 
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transcendence without allowing that new ideographic or monadic instantiations of this 
setting may qualify our sense or our account of it.  
 
Although he does not elaborate such a point, this would seem to indicate the way for 
Williams’s linguistic metaphysics to presume not only the transcendent God, but also the 
incarnate God. The Christian revelation is peculiarly in keeping with this philosophy, as 
Williams does say, since revelation occurs through a speaking personal body engaged with 
a community which he transforms through that very engagement. This is tantamount to 
saying that, for Christianity, Christ is the splendid embodied ideograph, of whom the 
world cannot contain its stories (John 21.25). To spell out Christ’s identity, embodied in 
these stories, “Crying Whát I dó is me: for that I came”,99 is to spell out his relations with 
everything else, the “ten thousand places” of Hopkins’s 1877 sonnet,100 and to do this is 
to represent, ring, deal out, speak and spell, “find tongue to fling out broad its name” – 
Christ.101  
 
But Williams claims to indicate the fittingness of Christian revelation to the scheme of his 
metaphysical framework, for which God acts at all times through nature. His framework is 
not overturned insofar as revelation fails to provide all the answers, but rather confirms 
                                                
99 G. M. Hopkins, “As kingfishers catch fire”, Poems and Prose W. H. Gardner ed (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1953), p. 51, line 8. See C. J. C. Pickstock, ‘The Game of the Stone’, Theology 115.3 (2012), pp. 
190-197.  
100 Hopkins, “As kingfishers catch fire”, line 12. 
101 “As kingfishers catch fire”, line 4; also line 12. 
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and intensifies the incompletion of linguistic response.102 He seeks to offer “a perspective 
for which difficulty is what makes sense”.103  
 
But one might qualify these metaphysically modest statements in two ways. First, it is 
true, insofar as, in one ideographic direction, to speak and spell Christ’s identity requires 
a framework akin to Augustine’s Christus Totus, which is the eschatological, cosmic Church. 
For now, we struggle our way towards Christ as to God through word, sacrament and 
deed. And yet, in the opposite ideographic direction, Christians know by faith that this 
one historic vertex of densities and relations enigmatically contains all the enigmas and all 
their resolutions, even though these will not resolve in such a way that we could 
anticipate.  
 
Secondly, it is clear that, for Williams, the revealed God is ontological and saturated, and 
by no means compressed and ontic. For this reason, one might seek to draw a connection 
between the fact that the ontological God of philosophical theology and the God of 
revealed theology are one and the same, and the aporetic tension which seems to arise 
(and to which Williams is at times commendably subject) between an emphasis upon 
language as transcendentally incomplete, and a qualifying emphasis upon the monadic 
reflection of plenitudinous transcendence as in a potential revisionary excess of the 
transcendental framework. In other words, any poem is in excess of any poetics, and may 
                                                
102 The Edge, pp. 180-185.  
103 The Edge, pp. 180. 
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cause us to revise our ideas as to such a poetics. It is for this reason that there cannot be a 
comprehensive scientific or computerised translation of poetic practice. But if any of the 
foregoing is correct, one should exalt neither the finished nor the unfinished, as Williams 
suggests with respect to the Koan and the via negativa, neither the transcendental condition of 
possibility nor its exemplified instances, and neither poetics nor any particular poem. 
There is no poem which could lay claim to finality as to content or form. Because of this 
problem, it might seem that the representation of God must remain restless until both the 
conditioning factor and the exemplifying factor coincide, as they are taken to do in the 
Incarnation, Christ being the final and not yet final poem, as well as the framing Logos of 
poetic principle.  
 
The foregoing suggestions only serve to strengthen Williams’s case that the embodied 
character of Christ is a peculiarly appropriate instance of an expectation of revelation, or 
of more direct divine disclosure which his linguistic natural theology has opened to view. 
 
Does this same natural theology point towards the Trinity? This would demand a long 
argument, but one could tentatively suggest that the ordered structure of number, 
governed by transcendental unity, and discovered at the core of nature, represents a 
universal finite echo of divine Paternal unity and originating power. Such a model stands 
in contrast to the transcendental unity taken as random sets, abstracted from the manifold 
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void, as for Alain Badiou.104 Equally, one could suggest, dilating Williams’s thesis that 
nature speaks, that habitual repetitions which constitute things, together with the habitual 
relations and boundaries between things, cease – like ellipses or silences – to be but 
numbers, and become implicitly signs, to the extent that what is related or bounded may 
be varied or revised in time. The relations and boundaries do not consist in a numerical 
exactitude of placing, but rather in the judgement of a meaningful character or impress of 
separation and combination.105 In this, we witness a participatory echo of the divine Logos, 
the symbolic supplement to nature, which, according to Williams, reveals it in adding to 
it and incompletely completing it. One could add that, insofar as these ellipses and 
intervals act as further densities and powers, or can be appropriated, one can say that the 
sign is newly enumerated and assumes the character of gift, which fuses meaning and 
thing, and which has been taken to characterise the Holy Spirit.  
 
With rising degrees of substantive appropriation and intensity, and of internalised 
relationality, nature, from the inorganic through to the human, presents this interweaving 
of number, sign and gift.  
 
                                                
104 Alain Badiou, Being and Event Oliver Feltham tr (London: Continuum, 2005), especially pp. 52-9, 208, 
251. 
105 The Edge, p. 180; on the intervention of judgement, see Repetition and Identity, pp. 1-83.  See further 
Masterman’s ideographical discussion of the “theological paradox [. . .] ‘God is Three and God is One’”, 
‘Metaphysical and Ideographic Language’, pp. 305-308; also p. 299.  
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In God, the tension between density and relation, which prevents horizontal compactness 
of dominating process, is not collapsed, but intensified in the coincidence of constitutive 
substantive relation. For this scheme, personified unity is the giving of the word, and both 
are the proffering of the word as renumbered gift, whereby a thingly density is added 
again to the transparency of sign.  The transcendent plenitude does not sustain a vertical, 
substantive compactness, which would suppress horizontal event and procedure. Rather, 
these are eternally given. One might conclude that, in God, for Williams, there is an 
infinite offering of a representing signifying addition to given numerical being. 
 
It does not seem inappropriate to suggest that Rowan Williams is arguing in The Edge of 
Words that we need to bring together mathematical and computer sciences with poetics, 
and all these together with theories of socially constitutive generosity and reciprocity, if 
we are to begin to approach the Triune as well as the Creator God. We must continue to 
improvise, speak and offer meaningful words to our neighbours in order to offer our own 
dilation of the complete Christic poem.  
 
 
 
